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the tenant binds himself to hold as lessee during the whole term,
and at its determination to deliver up the land to the lessor. Of
this obligation, the tenant cannot discharge himself by his own
wrong, although the wrong may, by working a forfeiture, give the
lessor another remedy, which is independent of the contract. If,
in every case of forfeiture, the lessor were bound to enter, the
tenant would be furnished with an easy discharge from a contract
on which he had received a partial benefit, and the onerous duties
of which remained to be performed. There is not, as is suggested,
anything anomalous in the character of the possession after an act
of forfeiture, which does not necessarily put an end to the estate.
The possession is not, thereafter, as to the rights of "one party
adverse, and as to the other fiduciary." If the lessor enters for
a forfeiture, the possession of the tenant is at an end; if he elects
to waive the forfeiture, the possession and the relative rights of
the parties are the same as before the act was committed.
But an oral disclaimer would not work a forfeiture of an estate
for years, and in the case in question the disclaimer had the effect
of determining the tenancy, because it depended upon the will of
both parties, and could not subsist after a disclaimer by one.of them.'
S. F. D.
(To he continued hereafter.)

RECENT AMERICAN DECISIONS.

In the Court of Appeale of the State of New York.
THE PEOPLE, EX REL. THE BANK OF THE COMMONWEALTH, VS. THE
COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS FOR THE CITY AND
COUNTY OF NEW YORK.
1. Stock in the public debt of the United States, whether owned by individuals or
-by corporations, is taxable under the laws of the State.
2. The taxation, by the State, of property invested in a loan to the Federal Government, is not forbidden by the Constitution of the United States, where no
unfriendly discrimination to the United States, as borrowers, is applied by the
1 See Graves V#. Wells, 10 Ad. & El. 427.
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State law, and property in its stock is subjected to no greater burdens than
property in general.
3. Whether Congress, for the purpose of giving effect to its powers to borrow
money, and of aiding the public credit, may constitutionally enact that a stock
to be issued by the Federal Government shall be exempt from taxation, quare.
4. The cases of McCullough vs. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 116; Osborn vs. United States,
Bank, 9 Wheat. 738; and Weston vs. The City of Charleston, 2 Pet., examined
and distinguished.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court.-The Court,
upon the application of the Bank of the Commonwealth, awarded a
certiorarito the Commissioners of Assessments and Taxes of the
city and county of New York, for the purpose of reviewing their
proceedings in assessing that corporation, in the year 1859. It
appeared from the admissions in the return of the commissioners,
that the Bank of the Commonwealth was a banking association
organized under the general banking law, with a capital actually
paid in of $750,000, out of which it had paid $188,834 84 for real
estate, consisting of its banking-house, leaving $561,165 16, of
which $103,000 was invested in the stock of the public debt of the
United States, of the loan of 1858, which was actually owned by
the corporation at the time the assessment was made. The bank
claimed, before the commissioners, that the stocks of the United
States were exempt from taxation under the Federal Constitution,
but that Board held otherwise, and assessed the corporation for
personal estate for the whole balance of capital after deducting the
sum paid for real estate, and it was taxed thereon. The Supreme
Court held that the stocks referred to were not exempt from taxation in this case, and affirmed the assessment; upon which the
present appeal was brought by the Bank.
Alexander W. Bradford, for the appellants.
Greene 0. Bronbon, for the respondents.
DENIo, J., (after discussing certain questions of a statutory
nature, and of local interest,) proceeded as follows:The question then arises, whether the public debt of the United
States is exempt, by the Federal Constitution, from taxation under
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the general laws for the assessment and collection of taxes which
are in force in this State. It is essential, in the outset, to have a
clear perception of the principles upon which taxes are imposed
under our State laws. We do not select particular subjects of taxation, and, upon motives of policy, burden these with the public contributions, or a disproportionate part of them, in exoneration of the
other property of the citizen. The rule, on the contrary, is to tax
every person for all the property he possesses. This doctrine is
announced at the commencement of the chapter of'the Revised
Statutes, respecting taxation: "All lands, and all personal estate,
within this State, whether owned by individuals or by corporations,
shall be liable to taxation, subject to the exemptions hereinafter
specified :" 1 R. S., 387. The exceptions are inconsiderable, and
only tend to prove the universality of the principle. And there is
no artificial rule of valuation, by means of which a discrimination
can be made in favor of or against any particular species of property. The real estate is to be assessed at its full and true value,
and that at which the assessors Would appraise it in payment of a
just debt due from a solvent debtor; and the personal estate is to
be set down at its full and true value, over and above the amount
of debts due from the person assessed. Laws of 1851, ch. 176,
§ 8. If, therefore, the stock in question is assessable at all, it is
to be included in the mass of the tax-payer's property, and is to
be set down at what it is really worth, in the same manner as
every other item of his taxable property. It is not taxable by
name, and there is no discrimination in favor of or against it, but
the bond or script which furnishes the evidence of the title is
regarded like any other security for money.
Having premised thus much, the question recurs, wh6ther there
is anything in the Constitution of the United States which, by a
fair interpretation, forbids the States, under their tax laws, from
including in the aggregate valhation of the tax-payer's property, in
respect to which he is to be taxed, moniey which he has lent to the
Federal Government, for which he holds its evidence of indebtedness. It is the Cohstitution alone which is to be looked td, for
Congress has never passed any statute on the subject. That body
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has from time to time authorized the executive department to borrow money, to fix the rate of interest to be paid, and to pledge the
public credit for its payment; but it has not undertaken to restrain
or limit the taxing powers of the State Governments in respect to
the money lent or the script or securities to be issued upon such
loans. It has said nothing on that subject. If there is any such
restraint or limitation, it exists in the Constitution itself. Among
the attributes conferred upon Congress by that instrument, is the
power "1to borrow money on the credit of the United States."
Art. 1, § 8. Then the Constitution declares that itself, and the
laws made pursuant to it, and the public treaties, shall be the
supreme law of the land, and paramount to the State Constitutions
and laws: Art. 6, 2. It may be safely admitted that any Act
of a State Legislature, forbidding, or placing any substantial obstacles in the way of negotiating, Federal loans from the citizens of
such State, would conflict with the Constitution. As the constitutional power to borrow money does not declare that it shall be procured within the Union, or from citizens of the United States, there
is, perhaps, no corresponding duty on their part to lend. Nor was
it intended that any such duty should be imposed. No enabling
power in respect to the lender was required. Nothing was necessary but that the political corporation, which it was proposed to
establish, should be endowed with the faculty of borrowing on
the public credit. As to the rest, the money markets of the world
were looked to for furnishing the other parties to the contract of
lending. An unfriendly act of legislation, which should exclude the
Federal Government from resorting to the money markets of a particular State for loans, though it might not seriously affect the
exercise of the borrowing power elsewhere, would be so obviously
hostile to the operations of the Government, that I am confident it
could not be sustained; and such is, no doubt, the effect of the
judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in the case to
be presently mentioned. But our laws for the assessment and collection of taxes, supposing them to include shares in the public debt
of the United States along with other personal property of the
vitizen, leave the Federal Government in precisely the same condi-
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tiuz. with any other borrower. It was the practice of independent
governments, as well as of municipalities and trading corporations,
anterior to the Constitution, as it is now, to borrow money in theii
own or in foreign States. The citizens of the several States, though
not at that time lenders in such loans to any considerable extent,
were capable of becoming such. They might lend money to the
Federal Government, to the State Governments, to foreign nations,
and to individuals. As to none of these, except the United States,
is there any pretence that the State Legislature was obliged to
waive the right of taxing the lender for his property in the obligation taken to secure the repayment of the money loaned. In like
manner, the Government of the United States possesses the same
power to borrow in the marts of the old world as of its own citizens.
But the foreign lender would of course be subject to the laws, as
to taxation, prevailing in the country of his domicil. The claim,
therefore, which is now interposed on behalf of the Federal Government, is of a right to present itself as a borrower in the money
markets of this State, in a different and far more favorable position than our own State Government occupies when it has occasion
for a loan, and, of course, than that which other borrowers, public,
corporate or private, foreign or domestic, can pretend to. It is,
moreover, the claim of a right to impose upon the Legislature of
the State disabilities in respect to the taxation of moneys loaned
to the United States, which there would be no pretence for challenging against any foreign country to which they might resort
for the negotiation of loans. The claim is not supported by any
specific language in the Constitution pointing to such consequences,
nor, as we have said, by the terms of any statute, but simply upon
the power to borrow money upon the public credit conferred by
the Constitution. Such a power, conferred by such general language, seems to us fully satisfied, so far as the State Governments
are concerned, when no unfriendly discrimination towards the
United States, as borrowers, is applied by the State laws; when
the General Government is admitted to negotiate upon the same
terms as other borrowers, public or private, with such of our citizens as may choose to become lenders of money, and when they

-

86

THE PEOPLE vs. THE COMMISSIONERS OF TAXES, ET AL.

are placed on the same precise footing, in all respects, as all other
borrowers, primd facie, the provision simply confers upon the
Government a capacity to become parties as borrowers upon the
public credit, to a contract of loan. If it had been intended, beyond this, to give them, in the States of the Union, an advantage
over all other borrowers, it is certainly remarkable that more explicit language was not used. We give no opinion on the question,
whether Congress could enact a law by which the lenders of money
to the Government should enjoy the advantage of exemption from
State taxation in respect to such loans. Events-may occur-perhaps they have already occurred-when the preservation of the
Constitution and the continuance of the Union may depend upon the
ability of the Government to obtain a seasonable supply of funds,
and we would not unnecessarily interpose a dictum which would
appear to circumscribe any powers which it may possess. But in
the absence of any such statute, -and resting upon the general grant
of power contained in the Constitution, we are of opinion that the
claim to be exempt from taxation cannot be allowed to prevail.
The argument in favor of exempting the holders of Federal indebtedness from State taxation is principally based upon the consideration of the paramount authority of the Federal Constitution
over the Constitutions and laws of the States. - The pre-eminence
of the former is beyond dispute. It is inherent in the nature of
an imperial Government, instituted to watch over and protect the
interests and welfare of particular local governments. The powers
conferred for such purposes must necessarily be absolute and uncontrollable. All general reasoning upon the subject is, however,
rendered unnecessary by the explicit provision Teferred to in the
Constitution itself. But before the State enactments can be called
upon to yield to Federal institutions, it must satisfactorily appear
that there is a conflict between them. Undoubtedly the Federal
Government could enter the money market with greater advantage
if it could promise to the lenders an immunity against State taxation in respect to the money to be loaned. But, as no other borrower can offer any such advantage, and as without it loans have
always been sought and obtained, and no doubt will continue to be,
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the withholding of it cannot be justly considered a restraint upon the
borrowing power. What is asked is not in truth the removal of an
obstacle, but a positive bounty to the lenders of money to the Government. It is claimed that an advantage should be conceded to
them which is rightfully withheld from every other lender. Hence,
it appears to us that there is no hostility between the laws of this
State, which attempt to tax its citizens, among the mass of their
property, for all their money loaned, without any exception of such
as may have been lent to the Federal Government, and the power
to borrow money which the Constitution ha5 conferred upon that
Government. Both provisions can stand perfectly well together,
and there is not really any conflict between .them.
The power of taxation is as essential to the existence of the State
Governments as that of borrowing is to the Nation. Both undeniably exist. The xight of the several States to include the public
creditors, in respect- to the money owing to them by the Nation,
among the itax-payers, may be one of great importance. The
amount of property existing in that form is now very large, and
public measures transpiring at this moment show that it is to be
greatly increased. A judgment which should exonerate that mass
of wealth from liability to contribute to the expenses of the State
Governments, might lead to considerable embarrassment. Besides,
it would create a class of favored citizens, who could put the taxgatherers at defiance, while the mass of the community would be
left to defray the whole expense of the State and local administrations. This, it is true, should not prevent the rendering of such a
judgment, if the true interpretation of the Constitution requires it.
But if it shall appear that the power of the Federal Government to
contract loans cannot be materially impaired by holding the public
creditor liable to pay his share of the public burdens; while the administration of the fiscal affairs of the States will be seriously
embarrassed by withdrawing a large mass of the property of the
citizens from liability to taxation, those circumstances (which are
now actually transpiring) would seem to call for a reconciling constructiqn which will allow both the great political powers to exist
without either being essentially impaired. The necessity of such a
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construction of the Federal Constitution was foreseen while the
draft of that instrument was under discussion, prior to its ratification by the State Conventions. One of the most indispensable
powers conferred upon Congress was that of laying and collecting
"taxes, duties, imposts and excises." But as the great bulk of the
expenses of public administration was left to be defrayed by the
States and their local divisions, the National Government being
limited to external relations and a few subjects of internal government, it was essential that the right of taxation should continue to
be enjoyed by the States, to enable them to meet these necessary
expenses. They were, however, prohibited from laying duties upon
imports or exports, or upon tonnage, without the consent of Congress; but as to all other subjects of taxation, embracing the real
and personal estates of the'citizens, the Constitution was silent as
to the rights of the States. A rigid construction of the provision
making the Federal laws, enacted pursuant to the Constitution,
supreme over those of the States, would forbid the latter from
exercising a concurrent right of taxation over subjects as to which
the taxing power of Congress should be applied. Suppose, for instance, that the General Government should lay a land tax, could a
State Government do the same thing while the Federal law remained*
in force? True, if the State tax was of moderate amount, the landowner would be able to pay both, and thus no embarrassment would
arise to the General Government. But it might be said, if you
admit the principle of concurrent taxation by the States, it will not
be possible so to limit the amount as to prevent inconvenience in
the exercise of the Federal power; and the Federal laws are
declared to be paramount to those of the States. Hence, it was
apprehended that the taxing power of the States might be held to
be taken away by the like power which the Constitution conferred
upon Congress. This objection was treated of in the 82d and 83d
Letters of Publius, written by Mr. Hamilt6n. He maintained, by a
convincing train of reasoning, that the taxing power of Congress
was not, in respect to any subjects, except imposts, exports and
tonnage, exclusive of or superior to that of the States, but that they
were concurrent. "The necessity," he said, "of a concurrent
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jurisdiction in certain cases, results from the division of the sovereign power; and the rule that all authorities, of which the States
are not explicitly divested in favor of the Union, remain with them
in full vigor, is not only a theoretical consequence of that division,
but is clearly admitted by the whole tenor of the instrument which
contains the Articles of the proposed Constitution. (Federalist,
No. 32.) He insisted that it was not a case of repugnancy in that
sense which would be requisite to work an exclusion of the States.
While he admitted that it was possible that a State might tax a
particular kind of property in a manner which would render it
inexpedient that a further tax should be laid on the same subject
by the Union, he still held that it would not imply a epnstitutional
inability to lay such further tax. He conceded that the particular
policy of the National and State systems might now and then fail
to coincide exactly, and that forbearance might be required. "It
is not, however," he added, "a mere possibility of inconvenience
in the exercise of powers, but an immediate constitutional repugnancy, that can, by implication, alienate and extinguish a preexisting right of sovereignty." (Id.) And he concludes, as the
result of the whole argument, that the individual States wolid,
under the proposed Constitution, retain an independent and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to any extent they might
stand in need of, by every kind of taxation except duties on imports, exports and tonnage. (Federalist, No. 33.)
The repugnancy between the concurrent powers of taxation
residing in the General and in the State Governments, seems
equally as striking as that which is alleged to exist between the
Federal power of borrowing money and the State power of taxing
all the property of the citizen, including his money invested in loans
to the Government. It may be said that the latter power can be
exerted to an extent which would impair the efficiency of the other.
But such an effect, if produced, would be incidental and indirect.
State taxation might, it is true, supposing a very extreme case, be
carried to such an extent that nothing would be left to lend to the
Nation. But if no unfavorable discrimation is made as to money
invested in Federal loans, it cannot be alleged that such excessive
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taxation would be any more hostile to the borrowing power of the
General Government than any other species of State misgovern-.
ment; and it can scarcely be pretended that the Federal institutions are supreme in such an absolute sense that any State pcwer
which, by a possible abuse, may impair the efficiency of some national attribute, is necessarily abrogated. Indeed, the complaint
on the part of those who oppose the claim of the State is, as has
been already remarked, not so much that our State tax law conflicts with the Federal power to borrow money, as that it does not
concede to the -Union superior rights in our money market over
those enjoyed by any other class of borrowers.
It remains to notice the judgments of'the Supreme Court of the
United States which, it is argued, have laid down the principles
which lead to the entire exemption' of Federal stock from State
taxation. In Mc~ullough vs. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat.
116, the question, in substance, was, whether the issues of bank
notes by the Maryland branch of the Bank of the United States
could be subjected to a stamp tax under the laws of Maryland.
That State had passed an act requiring banks transacting their business in that State, but which were not chartered by the State legislature, to issue their notes on stamped paper on which a certain duty
was to be paid, but for which any bank might commute by paying a
t;x of fifteen thousand dollars a year in advance. A heavy penalty
was provided against any bank officer who should issue unstamped
notes; and the action was brought against McCullough, the cashier
of the Baltimore branch of the Bank of the United States, to recover penalties for a violation of the act. The constitutional validity of the act of Congress incorporating the bank, was largely discussed, and was passed upon by the court; and its constitutionality
was sustained. The bank was considered a convenient, useful, and
essential instrument of the government in the prosecution of its
fiscal operations, and its establishment by Congress was held to be
the constitutional exercise of the power "to make all laws which
should be necessary or proper to carry into execution" the authority granted to the General Government. Then the question as to
the power of the States to tax the bank or its branches was con-
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sidered and determined. But when it had been once settled that
the bank was a constitutional agency and instrument for the transaction of the moneyed operations of the government, it followed
necessarily, as it seems to us, that it could no more be taxed by
State authority than the treasury department, the mint, the postoffice, or the army or navy; and it was upon this ground that the
Maryland statute was held to be unconstitutional.. The State
power of taxation, which was admitted to embrace everything
which existed by its own authority, or which was introduced by its
permission, was held not to "extend to those means which are employed by Congress to carry into execution powers conferred on
that body by the people of the United States." (See opinion of
Chief Justice Marshall, p. 429.) The same question again arose
in Osborn vs. The United States Bank, 9 Wheat. 788, which was
an action brought to test the validity of a statute of the State of
Ohio, by which an annual tax of $50,000 was imposed upon the
Ohio branch of the Bank of the United States, to be collected by
means of a warrant to be issued by the auditor of the State. The
question was again elaborately argued and considered by the court,
and the exemption of the bank and its branches again declared, on
the ground that the institution was an instrument, or, as it was
several times called in the opinion of the court, a machine for carrying on the moneyed operations of the National Government. In
the State laws under consideration in both thesb cases, the branches
of the bank were taxed, not in respect to their property, eo nomine,
as banks, and because they were banks. Perhaps it may be inferred
from the reasoning of the court, that they would have been held
equally exempt from taxation, if the tax had been laid on the corporation in respect to its capital or personal property. No idea,
however, was entertained that the money which was invested in the
stock of the bank was thereby withdrawn from State taxatiun.
Indeed, such a conclusion was explicitly disavowed in the opinion
of the Chief Justice in the first-mentioned case. "This opinion,"
he says, "does not deprive the States of any resources which they
originally possessed. It does not extend to a tax paid on the real
property of the bank, in common with the other real property
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within the State, nor to a tax imposed on the interest which the
citizens of Maryland may hold in this institution, in common with
other property of the same description throughout the State. But
this is a tax on the operations of the bank, and is, consequently, a
tax on the operation of an instrument employed by the government
of the Union to carry its powers into execution. Such a tax must
be unconstitutional :" 4 Wheat. 436.
Enough has been said to show that these cases bear no analogy
to the one before us. But, in Weston vs. The City Council of
Charleston, 2 Pet. 449, anno 1829, the subject of State taxation
of the debt of the United States, in the hands of an individual,
came directly before the Federal Supreme Court, and the judgment
was against the right to lay the tax. The case differs from the present only in the circumstance that the tax was not laid upon the
bulk of the property of the citizens, but only upon certain specified
securities, and that it was imposed upon the United States stock eo
nomine. It was imposed by the municipality of the city of Charleston, South Carolina, under authority derived from the legislature of
that State. It was laid, as the report states, "upon all personal
estate, consisting of bonds, notes, insurance stock, siz and seven per
cent. stock of the United States, or other obligatiops upon which
interest has been or will be received during the year, over and
above the interest which has been paid (funded debt of this State,
and stock in the incorporated banks of this State and the United
States Bank, excepted"); and the amount of the tax was "twentyfive cents upon every hundred dollars." Real estate does not appear
to have been embraced. Neither were goods or personal chattels of
any kind, or slaves, or the stock of the General Government paying
less than six per cent., or simple contract debts due to.the tax-payer,
or individual obligations on which, for any reason, interest should not
be paid within the year; and the public debt of the State, the stock
of all the State banks, and that of the Baik of the United States,
were in terms excepted. It was not, therefore, a tax upon the property of the tax-payer generally; but particular kinds of property
were selected fron the mass, embracing, in all probability, far less
than a moiety of the private property of the city, and the tax was
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assessed upon that, to the exoneration of all the residue. And thb
tax imposed was not limited to the aggregate of the public charges
for the year; but an arbitrary sum was exacted of-twenty-five cents
on each hundred dollars, whether that should be more or less than
the exigencies of the city government should call for. The different
system upon which the taxes of this State are assessed, has been
already shown. Under the ordinance of the city of Charleston, the
United States would not enter the money market of that city upon
an equal footing with all other borrowers. The State of South
Carolina, for instance, could assure those who should lend it money
that they should be exempt from city taxation, and the same advantage would be extended to capitalists who were minded to invest in
the stock of the State banks or in that of the Bank of the United
States. So, money or property invested in mercantile, manufacturing or other business, so long as it does not assume the form of interest paying obligations, would be exempt from taxation. The law,
or ordinance, discriminated, in respect to taxation, adversely to certain classes of securities, including the scrip of the public debt of
the United States. The effect upon the government was nearly the
same as though the funded debt of the Union had been singled out
as the subject of taxation. Including other securities, the whole
constituting only a part of the property of the citizens which might
be subjected to taxation, does not relieve the law from the charge of
visiting the whole of the public burdens upon particular kinds of
property in exoneration of the mass of it. Such a measure might
arise either out of motives of hostility to the property charged or
the business out of which it originated, or from a motive of hostility
to the interests taxed, or a desire to favor the owners of the residue
at the expense of such interests. In either case it might easily be
carried to the extent of seriously discouraging or entirely destroying the interests discriminated against. But where all the private
property of the community is taxed ratably, no such effect could
follow, and under such a system, moreover, there is but little danger
of oppressive taxation. In levying such a tax, the legislature acts
equally upon all its constituents. In our opinion, the judgment
last referred to is distinguishable in principle from the case we
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are considering, in the point to which we have now referred. If
the Federal stock can be taxed separately and specifically at any
amount which a State legislature, or a municipality to which its
power has been delegated, shall see fit.; the government in seeking to obtain money on loan may be effectually driven out of
the markets of such State. But such a consequence could never
happen under the existing tax law of this State. The idea that
the legislature would dare, or would be permitted, by excessive
taxation, to destroy or seriously embarrass the interests of all, the
property holders!of the State, is not to be supposed.
Intending as we do to follow implicitly the matured judgments
of the Supreme Court of the United States, 'pronounced in cases
arising under the Federal Constitution and Laws, we yet conceive
ourselves at liberty to receive or to reject any dicta which were not
called for by the facts of-the case adjudged, according to our own
sense of their conformity or want of conformity. to law. We are
aware that some portion of the reasoning of the opinion of the court,
prepared by the venerable Chief Justice in the case referred to,
would embrace the present controversy, though other parts of it we
think refer to the tax under consideration as-laid specifically upon
Federal stock; and that in-the-dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Thompgon, the majority of the court are understood to assume the
broad ground that the stock of the United States is not taxable in
any shape or manner whatever. But we -think it was not legally
possible for the court to decide, that such stock could not be taxed
along with the mass of -the tax-payer's property, under a taxing
system like the one prevailing in this State, while determining a
controversy in which the actual facts'presented by the litigation
disclosed, a case of taxation discriminating adversely to such stock.
Such a question as is -claimed to have been decided, was not discussed by the counsel on the argument. The counsel for the plaintiff in error, who was the party seeking t6 avoid the tax, did not
contend that the stock would be exempt under a system which
should embrace all property, or even all public funds. He said:
"1The ordinance 'does not impose a tax upon all public funds, but
8pecifically on the six and seven per cent. itoc of the United
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States. Thus, there are selected as the particular objects of taxation, these debts of the Government of the United States."' And
the counsel laid before the court as a part of their argument the
opinion of three of the judges of the Constitutional Court of South
Carolina, who, holding that the stock was not taxable, dissented
from the opinion' of the majority. But they placed their dissenut
on the grouid that the tax was upon the stock, eo nomine, and was
thus a burden imposed upon the credit of the United States. "
We differ, with natural reluctance, from even an obiter dictum
of so great and wise a judge as Chief Justice Marshall, especially
when apparently concurred in by a majority of the judges of the
national tribunal of last resort; but we are happy to know that
if we have fallen into an error, it can readily be corrected. If
that eminent court shall, upon a reconsideration of the question,
adjudge that stocks of this description are universally exempt
from taxation, we shall cheerfully conform our judgments to such
decision; but until such review shall be had, we think it safer to
follow the direction of our own convictions. The question is confessedly one of very great importance. If we determine it in
favor of the tax-payers, the public authorities cannot appeal to
the Federal court, as it is only in the case of a right, claimdd
under the Constitution or laws of the United States, which has
been denied by a State court, that the National tribunal has'jurisdiction, whereas the judgment, which w6 actually render, caurbe
carried immediately to the court of the last tesort.
The judgment of the Supreme Court is affirmed.
MASOIr,
J., also delivered an opinion for affirmance; SELDiw,
LOTT, JAMES and HOYT, JJ., concurred, without, however, passilag
upon the questions first discussed, as to the construction odfour
statutes, as to which four of the judges were understood to exprigs
a different opinion from that stated by Judge Denio.The question raised in this case is for The recent case of Almy vs. State of
the ist time distinctly decided. As an California, 24 How. U. 5. 169, (1860,)
elaborat6 discussion by a learned and may have some bearing upon the quesable Court; it furnishes material for the tion. A tax upon a hill of lading of gold
final adjudication of the matter by the exported, was held to be in reality a tax
Supreme Court of the United States. upon the yoM itseV. Says the C6urt in
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substance, Ch. J. Taney delivering the
opinion, "A bill of lading, or some written instrument 6f the same import, is
necessarily always associated with every
shipment of articles of commerce from
the ports of one country to those of another. Such instruments are hardly less
necessary to the existence of such commerce than casks to cover. tobacco, or
bagging to cotton, when exported, for
no one would put his property in the
hands of a ship-master without taking
written evidence of its receit on board the
vessel, and of the purposes for which it is
placed in his hands." In like manner, it
may be urged, that government stocks
and securities of the same import are
always associated with the borrowing of
money. No one would think of lending
ta the government, without the evidence

of the loan which they furnish, and the
convenient means of transfer which they
supply. They are the instruments of
borrowing, as bills of lading are the instruments of commerce. They are not
only evidence of the indebtedness of the
government to the lender, but they also
supply the means by which that indebtedness can be contracted. If this view
be correct, the fact that they were taxed
by a State in common with other subjects, would not be decisive, for it is
conceived that the instruments or machinery by which the general government carries on its constitutional operations, cannot be taxed by the States at
all. The tax becomes, in substance, an
interference with the exercise of the
power of borrowing, itself.
T. W. D.

In the Supreme Judioial Court of New Hfampshire, August, 1861.
GEORGE W. PINKERTON Vs. MANCHESTER AND LAWRENCE RAILROAD.

1

1. Upon a pledge of stock in a railroad corporation in New Hampshire, there
should be such delivery as the nature of the thing is capable of, and to be good
against a subsequent attaching creditor, the pledgee must be clothed with all
the usual muniments and indicia of ownership.
2. Under the laws of New Hampshire, a record of the ownership of shares must be
kept by such corporations in this State, and by proper certifying officers resi4ent
herein.
3. On the transfer of stock the delivery will not be complete, until an entry of such
transfer is made upon the stock record, or it be sent to the office for that purpose, and the omission thus to perfect the delivery willbeprimdface, and if un.
explained, conclusive evidence of a secret trust, and therefore as matter of law
fraudulent and void as to creditors. Where the transfer was made at a distance
-from the office, and the old certificates surrendered, and new ones given by a
transfer agent appointed for that purpose, and residing in a neighboring State,
-1 We are indebted'to thq courtesy of Mr. Justice Bellows for the opinion of the
Court in this importint case at so early a date after its delivery, for which he will
be pleased to accept our most sincere thanks.-EDS. Am. L. REG.
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proof that the proper evidence of such transfer was sent to the keeper of the
stock record to be entered by the earliest mail communication, although not
received until an attachment had intervened, would be a sufficient explanation
of the want of delivery, and such transfer would be good agaifst the creditdr.
4. But where the'pledge was made in Boston on the eighth day of Suly by a dbli-'
very over of the certificates, and nothing more done until the third day of the
following August, and then the old certificates surrendered to the transfer agentthere, and newr ones received from him, and notice given by the first mail to the
office at Manchester in this State: It was held, that as against an attachment
made lietWee the obtaining the new certificates and the notice at the office, the
possession was not seasonably taken, and the transfer was therefore not valid.
6. Where, upon a sale odn execution of shares in a corporation, a certificate is demanded of the corporation by the purchaser, and a suit is brought for refusingto give such certificate, the measure of damages is the value of the stock at the
time of the demand; with interest, and not the value at the time of trial or at"
ahy intermediate period.

rerey, Clark and Bmith, for plaintiff.
V. C. and S. G. Clark; for defendantThe opinion of the Court was delivered by
BELLOWS, J.-Tliis is an action of assumpsit for refusing on
demand, to give to the plaintiff a certificate of twenty-nine sharesof the stbek of the Manchester and- Lawrnce Railrod,' ahdc to
pay him the dividends on the same stock.
It appeared that on the 8th day of July, 1854, one Holbrook
owned'ninety-six shares of tfiat stock, and then trafisferred them
Shy indorsement on the back of the certificates to the Granite

Bank, Boston, of which he was President, as collateral security"
for his debts to that bank, amounting tb over $100,000.

The certificates were at the same time delivered to the bank,
where they remained without any entry of a transfer on the books
of the railroad until the third day of the ensuing August, at a
little past 2 o'clock P. M.,. when they -were delivered by Holbrook
to Moses J. Mandell, who entered'the transfer in a; book kept by
him as transfer agent, at' the 'office of Browni & Sbns, in Boston,
of which firm said Mandell* was a member, and the certificates
were surrendered- by the bank to Mandell, and- new ones issued by

him for the same stock to the bank, he being furnished with blank
cefti-fibates signed -bythe Presidlnt" and Tieasurer for such pui-

98

PINKERTON vs. MANCHESTER AND LAWRENCE RAILROAD.

poses. And by the earliest conveyance Mandell sent the old
certificates, with notice of the transfer, to the office of the railroad
at Manchester, which was received there at about eight o'clock in
the afternoon of the same third day of August, and afterwards, inSeptember, 1857, a corresponding entry of the transfer was made
in the proper books at that office, as of the date of Sept., 1857.
It also appeared that the Treasurer of the railroad corporation,
by vote, in June, 1852, was authorized to appoint a transfer agent
in Boston, and that on said third day of August, and for some
time before, said Mandell was acting as.such.transfer -agent, and
was furnished by the corporation with books to be used for that
purpose, and with blank certificates signed by the proper officers
of the corporation, and to be filled up and used by him in the
course of his business as such agent; and it appeared also that
what said Mandell did in issuing new certificates and sending
notice to the office at Manchester, and entering the transfer on
the books kept by him, was in the.reguiar course of his business
as such transfer agent, and that the .plaintiff was aware of. this
course of business; and that said Mandell acted, as such agent..
- It further, appeared, that on said,third day ofAugust,.the plaintiff, a little before noon, went to iMandell's said place of business,
to ascertain if Holbrook had. transferred hisstock, and finding
that no transfer had been entered there, he went to Manchester,
procured a writ upon a note he held against said,.Holbrook, and
attached his stock in said corporation at eight minutes before five
o'clock in the afternoon of said August d. and without any knowledge in- him or the' officer serving the writ, of any assignment
of the stock.
That judgment was obtained'in that suit, and twenty-nine shares
of that stock sold to the plaintiff to satisfy it, on the 12th day of
July, 1856 ; the lien acquired by the, riginal attachment having
been preserved, and the question is, whether the assignment to
the Granite Bank was good against .the attaching creditor.
To the regularity of the proceedings upon the attachment and
sale upon execution, there is no exception, nor is there any objection to the existence of a bond fide debt to the Granite Bank; but
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the only question is, whether the transfer was so far completed as
to be valid against an attaching creditor.
There is nothing either in the charter or by-laws of the corporation, to prescribe or regulate the mode of making a transfer,
but it is contended by the plaintiff's counsel, that until it is entered or recorded in the stock books of the corporation kept in
this State, the transfer is not valid as against an, attaching creditor.
And the argument is put upon two grounds:
I. That by force of the various statutes upon the subject of the
evidence of ownership of stock, and the keeping of the records,,
and the residence of the officers and their duties, such entry or
record is necessary to a valid transfer.
II.That to constitute a complete delivery of the stock, such
entry and record are necessary, as the natural and recognised
indicia of ownership, and that without such entry the stock must
be deemed to be still in possession of the assignor, which implies
a secret trust, and is, therefore, in the judgment of the law, fraudulent and void as to creditors.
In regard to the second ground taken by the plaintiff's counsel
-namely, that without such entry or record the possession of the
stock cannot be deemed to have been changed-it is alleged in
answer by the counsel for the defendant, that the entry or record
in the books of the transfer agency was sufficient, and the same
gs if entered in the books at Manchester; and it is also suggested
that all the possession was given that the nature of the property
was capable of, as in case of that of sale of goods at sea.
And it appears that, by the earliest conveyance after the. old
certificates were surrendered, the new one was sent to the office at
Manchester, with notice of the transfer.
Had this been done immediately upon the pledge and transfer
recorded in the books at Manchester, a question might have -arisen
whether the possession was not protected without unreasonable
delay, and so as to prevail against an intervening attachment, as in
Bicker vs. ross, 5 N. H. 570, and in the case of the sale of a ship
in a distant port as in Putuamvs. Dutch, 8 Mass. 2,87; Portland
Bank vs. Stacy, 4 Mass. 661; or abroad or at sea$ as in the cases
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cited in Bicker vs. Cross, and as in Canard vs. Atlantic Rs. Co.,
1 Peters, 884, 449, and Jay vs. &ears,9 Pick. 4, and Buffarton
et al. vs. Curtis et al., 15 Mass. 528) and 1 Smith's Leading Cases,
-6, 7.
In this class of cases it may be said that the want of delivery at
the time is explained within the principle of Coburn vs. Pickering,
8. N. H. 415, upon the ground that such delivery was impossible,
and therefore the presumption of fraud is repelled. See Gardner
vs. Howland, 2 Pick. 599, and Peters vs. Ballister, 3 Pick. 495.
On this ground a similar doctrine has been held in the case of
the- sale of a slave too sick to be moved at the moment.
But in the case before us this question does not arise, because the
assignment was made on the eighth day of July, and nothing sent
to the office until the third day of August, and this we think could
not be regarded, as using due diligence to perfect the assignment,
if such.entry and record was necessary. Nor do we think that books
of the transfer agent in Boston can be regarded as the records or
accounts of the shares or interests of the corporators contemplated
by the several statutes, in providing for the means of taxing the
several shareholders, enforcing their private liability, or for giving
creditori the necessary information to enable them to attach or levy
upon the stock. On the contrary, we think it quite clear that the
law contemplates the keeping a record of the ownership of the stock
in the State, or by an officer resident here, and competent to certify
the same. Sect. 9, of ch. 953, Laws of 1850, comp'd St., ch. 150,
§ 67, provides that the treasurer and clerk of railroad corporations shall reside in this State, except where the railroad is part of
one created by the acts of two or more States; and this provision
is not affected by the fact that the payment of dividends to stockholders is provided for at the place of business of the corporation
in.
this State. The section provides that the clerk and treasurer
shall reside "within this State, and.all the tooks, papers and funds
of said corporation, with the foregoing exception-.-i e. in case of a
road in two States--shall be kept therein, or shall provide for the
payment of all. dividends to the stockholders in this State, at. the
place of'business of the corporation in this. State." This alterna-
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tive provision we think is designed as a substitute for the keeping
of funds for the~payment of dividends, and the books and papers
connected therewith, in this State, and is not to be construed to
dispense with the necessity of keeping a record or account of the
stock in this State, or of the residence here of the clerk or treasurer. By the Revised Statutes, ch. 146, sect. 13, which is prior
to the act in question, no person could be eligible to .the office of
clerk of any corporation unless he was an inhabitant of the State,
and it is quite clear, from the whole course of the legislation prior
to this law of 1850, that the keeping of the records or accounts of
the shares or interests of the corporators, by the treasurer, or other
officer in this State, has been steadily contemplated by the legislature. This is manifest by the law requiring the clerk of the corporation to return a list of the stockholders to the town clerk,
under a penalty of fifty dollars; Comp. St., ch. 147, sees. 8 to 12;
the provision for the attachment of stock, by leaving a copy of
the writ and return with the clerk, treasurer or cashier; the provision requiring the officer having the care of the records of stock
to exhibit, on demand, to the officer miking- such attachment, a
certificate of the number of shares owned by the debtor, and to
exhibit to him such records and documents as may be useful to the
officer in discharging his duty, and subjecting him to a penalty
and damages for neglect. Comp. St., ch. 207, § 16 to 21. So in
relation to manufacturing corporations, it is provided, that if. the
treasurer does not reside within this State, the stock record shall
be kept within this State by the Clerk.
With these provisions and this policy in view, it will hardly be
contended that the alternative provision in regard to the payment
of dividends in this State is to be regarded as a substitute for the
residence of the clerk and treasurer, and the keeping of the stock
record in this State. For it is quite obvious that such provision
for the payment of dividends can, in no aspect of the case, be
regarded as a substitute for keeping the stock record here, and in
the hands of a certifying officer of the corporation.
To authorize a construction that would, make ,this 'alternative
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provision a substitute for all the rest, would require language
much more explicit than we find there. If, then, an entry of the
transfer in the books of the corporation be necessary to a valid
transfer as against this plaintiff, we hold that it must be done in
the books kept in this State. The question then is, whether such
entry is necessary.
In this case both the plaintiff and the Granite Bank were creditors of Holbrook, the former owner of the stock, and both claim
under him-one by sale on execution, the other by voluntary
transfer from the debtor.
By the law of New Hampshire, as it has existed ever since
1812, stock in all corporations is subject to attachment and execution, and the question is, whether the transfer was so far perfected
as to be valid against the plaintiffs attachment.
In deciding this question it is not material to determine the
precise character of this property, whether such stocks be regarded
as cioses in action or not; because we are satisfied that it comes
within the provisions of the statute of 13 Eliz., c. 5, even if regarded as Choses in action.
The terms used in that statute in respect to personal property,
are "goods and clattels," but they are construed to embrace things
in action as well as in possession. 2 Black. Com. 384, and note,
-Ford J-Sheldon's case, 12 Co. Rep., applying to an Act of Parliament. Byal et al. vs. Bowles et al., 1 Atk. 164, 182; S. C. 1 Yes.
348, 368, 866-7, 369, 371. This case involved the construction of
the terms "goods and chattels," in the statute of 21 James 1,
relating to conveyafices by persons afterwards becoming bankrupt, and it was held that they included a conveyance of a share
in a trading concern by one of the partners, and it was expressly
held that these terms in an Act of Parliament would include choses
in action.
And such, we think, has been the doctine of the courts in this
State, as shown in cases of foreign attachment and otherwise.
Hutchins vs. Sprague, 4 N. H. 469; Giddings vs. Colman et al.,
12 N. H. 153; Langley vs. Berryj, 14 N. H. 82. See Newman vs.
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Bagley . Tr., 16 Pick. 570; and Richmondville H. Jo. vs. Pratt
et al., 9 Conn. 487.
The claim of the Granite Bank arises from what must be regarded
as a pledge, and, to be valid, a delivery is essential at least as
against creditors.
To constitute such delivery the assignee should be clothed with
the usual marks and indications of ownership.
In the case of things in possession, there should be a manual
delivery and change of possession, or its equivalent.
In the case of things in action, the usual muniments of title
should be conferred upon the assignee. As to the former, it is
held, that if the articles are bulky, the delivery of the key of the
warehouse in which they are deposited, will suffice.
Byal vs. Bowles, 1.*Yea. 362. See Patten vs. Smith, 5 Conn.
200.
So in case of the sale of goods at sea, a transfer of the bill
of lading by indorsement, is, by the commercial law, valid as to
creditors.
Caldwell vs. Ball, 1 T. R. 205, 215; Conard vs. Atlant Ins.
Co., 1 Peters, 444, and cases cited; Lanfearvs. Sumner, 17 Mass.
112.
A bill of lading is an acknowledgment under the hand of the
captain, that he has received the goods and will deliver them to
the person named therein, and by the well settled principles of
the commercial law is assignable, by indorsement, and this is
equivalent to the actual delivery of the goods.
Such transfer is the ordinary and appropriate mode of selling
goods at sea; and it was held in Caldwell vs. Ball, 1 T. R..205,
215, that where two bills of lading were signed by the same captain, the person to whom one was first transferred would hold the
goods. So where the goods sold are in the custody of another,
and an order is given to the depositary to deliver them to the
buyer, which is presented to him, there the sale is complete.
Plymouth Bank vs. Bank of Xorfolk, 10 Pick. 459; Tuxworth
vs. Moore, 9 iPick. 348.
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.Intho qae of xe4 estate mortgaged, and the title deeds are
left with the mortgagor, who makes a second mortgage, and deive~rs the title deeds, the first will, in equity, 'be postponed to the
second, .al vs. Towes,. 1 Ves. 860.
In regard to the assignment of choses in action, as a bond or
prQmissqry note, a delivery is essential as against a subsequent
assignee, or probably a creditor: _Ryal vs. Bowles, 1 Yes. 848;
Bennet, J., p..462; Parker Baron, 866-7.
As to goods and chattels in possession, a substantial change
of possession is, by our law, essential where it can be had. The
want of it unexplained, is conclusive evidence of a secret trust,
and shows the sale to be fraudulent as to creditors.
In the case of stocks, the natural and appropriate indication of
ownership is the entry upon the stock record.
This is indicated by the ordinary course of dealing in such property, and has been assumed in our legislature .for many years,
and it is manifested in the provisions in regard to returns of stock
by the clerks or treasurers for the purposes of taxation; private
liability and attachment, all of which assume that the records will
show the ownership of the stock; and some of which continue the
individual liability so long as the returns, based upon such record,
remain unchanged.
In respect to manufacturing corporations, by express provisions
a transfer of stock avails nothing against an attachment until
entered upon the corporation records. So, too, such record is expressly recognised as essential in the certificates used in the transfer of the stock in question.
Until then, the transfer is recorded, or is entered for record,
we think there has been no such change of possessipn as will prevail against an attaching creditor, unless in cases as before suggested, where due diligence has been used to make such record,
and the attachment has intervened.
We are aware that choses in action may be transferred by a
simple delivery of the evidence of indebtedness, with an indorsement thereon in'certain cases; but it will be observed in these
cases, that all such changes in the indications of ownership, as the
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nature of the case will admit, is required. If, therefore, upon the
transfer of a bond or bill of exchange, it be retained by the
assignor, a subsequent purchaser, without notice, would acquire a
good title. Indeed, it may be laid down as a general principle
governing the transfer of every species of personal property, that
to be good against innocent third persons, such transfer must be
accompanied with such change of possession and indications of
ownership, as the nature of the thing is capable of. Otherwise
the seller is enabled, by means of an apparent owneiship, to obtain a fictitious credit, and to deceive both creditors and purchasers. To avoid such consequences the law has always watched
such conveyances with extreme solicitude.
In this respect we see no distinction between -things in action
and things in possession, but for anything we can see, the same
general rules must apply to both.
It is true that at common law choses in action were not the subject of attachment or execution, except by the custom of London,
and then only when the garnishee lived in the city and the debt
arose there: Com. Dig., tit. Attachment, A. D. Nor did it extend to stocks in the East India Company. But now by the laws
of New Hampshire, of no distant date, choses in action are made
the subject of foreign attachment, and stocks in corporations may
now be attached specifically like things in possession.
Under the circumstances, and in view of the rapid increase and
the vast amount of such property, it becomes extremely material
to make a correct application to this species of property, of the"
principles which regulate the transfer of other kinds of property.
In the case before us, the stock was pledged to the Granite Bank
on the eighth day of July, 1854, as collateral security for the
owner's indebtedness, by a delivery of the certificates indorsed by
him to the bank, of which he was then president, and nothing
further was done toward taking possession of the stock until the
third day of the following August, when the old certificates were
surrendered to the transfer agent, and new ones received by the
bank.
The act of transfer by Holbrook must be regarded as done on the
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eighth of July, and whatever was done afterwards was the act of
the bank; and the question is, whether due diligence was used by
the bank in taking possession of the stock. It may be assumed,
that as the transfer was made at a distance from the place where
the stock records were kept, a reasonable time 'should be allowed
to communicate with the officer; but the case finds nothing, and
nothing is suggested that could justify a jury in finding that the
entry was made in a reasonable time after the act of transfer.
There is no suggestion that the communication was made at the
earliest convenient opportunity after the transfer. on the eighth of
July; and if there was a daily mail communication with Manchester there could be no ground to claim that due diligence was used.
Nor could the exchange of certificates at the transfer agency be
regarded as equivalent to a record, or the entry for that purpose
in the office at Manchester. If forwarded by the transfer agent
and recorded, it then would be perfected, but we are unable to
regard the act of the transfer-agent, in respect to the record, as
anything more than the act of a mere agent of the bank.
. 'To give to the notice and entry at the transfer agency the effect
of a record or entry upon the stock books of the corporation would,
as we think, be contrary to the policy of the law, which requires, as
the chief evidence of ownership, the record or entry in the books of
the corporation kept in this State. Such a rule is simple and easy
of application, and is demanded for the convenience of the corporation and the interests of the stockholders and their creditors.
The transfer agent is in no sense the keeper of the stock record,
and notice to him is not notice to the keeper of that record. The
case, then, is one where due diligence was not used to take possession of the stock; but in respect to the creditors of Holbrook it was
for nearly one month left in his possession, he retaining, as before,
the usual indications of ownership, such as membership of the corporation, and a right to vote on the stock; his private liability for
debts, and his liability to be taxed, being for all purposes the
ostensible owner of the stock. Indeed, the retaining these evidences of ownership in the case of an absolute sale of the stock, or
any transfer which implies a-delivery, would be no less inconsis-
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tent, and no less indicative of a trust than the retaining possession
of goods capable of manual delivery upon an absolute sale. If
there be any substantial difference the inconsistency would be more
marked in the case of the stock, inasmuch as in case of goods and
chattels which are tangible, it is often convenient to disconnect
the use from the ownership for a time; and we are inclined to
think that the retention of the possession of goods, which are tangible, would be less likely to mislead creditors and purchasers than
the omission to make the proper entry in the stock -record on the
transfer of stocks. Such a neglect to perfect the transfer of stock
as this case discloses, could scarcely fail to excite suspicions as to
the existence of a fixed intention to perfect the transfer, at all, at
the time it was made. Whatever the fact may be in this case, it is
quite apparent that -if such transfers are held good as against
creditors, it would open a wide field for the mischiefs which are
denounced by the statute of 13 -Elz. Especially would it be so
in these times, -when -so large a proportion of all the property of
, . 1,
the country is in corporation stocks.
We are brought to the conclusion, that the possession of the
stock was not changed, and that no satisfactory explanation for it
is given; and that, therefore, there is shown a secret trust, which
avoids the transfer as to this plaintiff.
The conclusion we have reached on this point renders it unnecessary to consider the other.
The only question remaining is as to the measure of damages.
The general rule here and elsewhere is, that in an action pn a
contract to deliver goods, stocks, and other personal property, the
measure of damages is the value of the property at the time and
place of delivery.
But a distinction has been made in some jurisdictions, by which,
where the price has been paid in advance, the plaintiff has been
allowed to elect.the value at the time when the property ought to
have been delivered, or at the time of trial, or, as some cases hold,
the value at any intermediate period.
Such a distinction has been recognised in England and in New
York, and in the Courts of some other States in the Union, upon
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the ground that the seller, 'having got the money of the plaintiff,
the latter may be deprived of the means, by the seller's act, of
going into the market and purchasing the same property at the
then market prices.
In Shepard vs. Johnson, 2 East, 210, it was held, in an action
for not replacing stock loaned at the time appointed, it having
afterwards risen, that the measure of damages was the value at
the time of trial.
This -doctrine, and the reason for it, was recognised in Gunning
vs. Wilkinson, 1 C. & P. 625, which was an action of trover for
East India warrants for cotton, which had risen after the conversion. So in Ganisford vs. Carrotet al., 2 B. &-C. 624; McArthur
vs. Ld. Seaforth, 2 Taunt. 257; Payne vs. Burke, 2 East, 213;
note to Shepard vs. Johnson; Downes vs. Buck, 1 Starkie Rep.
318, it was held that plaintiff might estimate his damages at the
value of the stock at the time of trial. In .arrison vs. Harrison, 1 0. & -P. 412, on a bond to replace stock, it was held that
the value at the time of trial was the measure of damages.
These cases go upon the ground that a judgment for damages,
equal to the market value at the time of such judgment, would
enable the plaintiff to purchase similar property, and thus operate
like a decree for specific performance of the contract.
IvI. Starkie, in his work on Evidence, vol. 3d, 1624, 'ays it
down, that the damages may be the value at the time of delivery
or the time of trial, "or, as it seems, on any intermediate day ;"
but he cites against the rule MeArthur vs. Ld. Seaforth, 2 Taunt.
257.
In 3 Phillips's Evidence, 108, it is said that the plaintiff may
elect the value at the time of delivery, or the time of trial, but
not, as it seems, upon any intermediate day; and see 1 Saund. on
Plead. & Evidence, 377 and 677, and Chitty on Contracts 893,
note 2, by Perkins.
In Dutch vs. Warren, which is stated in Moses vs. Macfarlan, 2
Burr. 1010, where there was a contract to deliver stock, the price
being paid in aavance, held, that the value at the time of the
breach was the measure of damages, though less than the sum pa;d
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So on a loan of stock to be replaced at a certain day, held,
that the measure of damages was the value on that day. Saunders,
Kentish & Hawkesly, 8 T. R. 162. In- West vs. Wentworth et al.,
3 Cowen Rep. 82, it was held, that for the breach of a contract to
deliver salt, the price having been paid in advance, the measure
of damages was the highest market price between the time the
salt was due and the time of trial; and the cases cited to sustain
the decision are Cartelyan vs. Lansing, 2 Caines' Cas. Err. 216
and Shepard vs, Johnson, 2 East, 211, neither- of which goes to
that extent.
The case of Clark vs. -inney, 7 Cowen, 681,. decided- b'y the
same Judge, Sutherland, takes the same ground after a review, of
the English cases, and these decisions have been followed by the
Courts of some other States, as in'Bank of Montgomery.vs. Beeee
26 Penn. 143, which was-an action against the plaintiff in err6r
for wrongfully refusing to allow the defendant in error to' subscribe
for and receive certain stock in the bank, The Court fully recog
nises the rule laid down in West vs. Wentworth and Clark vs. Piney, as.applicable to stocks, but suggests a different rule in respect
to articles which are unlimited in production. The Court hold,
however, that it is immaterial whether the stock has been paid. for
or not, but that the rule is the same in either case, and the Courtcites Cud vs. Butter, 1 P. Wins, 570,. and note, which holds, he
same doctrine, as it would seem, where the price was not paid in:
advance, and citing also Vaughan vs. Wood, 1 Mylne & Keen, 403.
In West vs. Pritchard,19 Conn; 212, it was held, that plaintiff.
was entitled to the value at the time of trial, or at the time appointed for the delivery, and that this rule applies to other personal property as well as stocks, although in Wells vs. Abernethy,
5 Conn. 227, Hosmer, C. J;, had expressed a strong repugnance
to the doctrine. BNandon vs. Barlow, 4 Texas, 289, and Calvit vs.
MUc~adden, 13 Texas, 324, accord with West vs. Pritchard, in
giving the value at the time of trial. In Shepard vs. .Hampton, 3
Wheat. 200, is a dictum of Marshall, C. J., to the effect simply,.
that he should think the value at the time of delivery would noi
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be the rule where the price was paid in advance, but he does not
state -what it should be.
On the other hand, the case of Startup vs. 0ortuzzi, 2 Crompton, Meeson & Roscoe, 165, is in opposition~to the dicta in Gainsford vs. Carrol, and to Clark vs. Pinney, and West vs. Wentworth.
In that case, which was an action for not delivering a cargo of
linseed according to a contract of sale, on which the plaintiff had
advanced a moiety of the price, Lord Abinger charged the jury
that plaintiff was not entitled to damages according to the value
at the time of trial, and that it was not 'like a suit.for not replacing
stock-and this was sustained, on motion for a, new trial, by the
whole court-there being no evidence that plaintiff had in fact sustained any special damage. See a statement of this case in Suydam vs. Jenkins, 3 Sandf. Sup. Ct. Rep.. 641, .where,.Duer, J., reviews the cases, and holds, in opposition to. West vs. Wentworth.,
and Clark vs. Pinney, that the .highest. intermediate price ought
never to be taken as the rule of damages, either -in trover or
asumpsit, unless it be shown that the plaintiff would (not might)
have realized that price had the, contract been performed.
, This case, commencing page 614, is -an elaborate review of tho
eases, and the court hold that the rule ,of damages must. b9 the
same in trespass, trover, replevin, or assumpsit.
Mr. Chancellor Kent, in 2d Coin. 648, 480, note, says he does
not regard the distinction as to the rule -of damages arising from a
payment of the price in advance, or not, as well founded or supported; and he says that the value at the time of the breach isoa
plain, stable, and just'rule; ind so it seems is the conclusion in
Sedgwick on Damages, after a review of the cases, p. 260 to 280,
277 ; and see cases cited in 2 Kent's Com. 648 in note. In Gray vs.
Portland Bank, 3 Mass. 364-390, it was held that the value of
the stock at the time of delivery-, and not on the day oi trial, was
the true measure of damages; and the cage of Shepard vs. Johnson, 2 East, 2.11, is expressly denied. Sedgwick, J., safys this
rule has been long established and invariably adhered to in Massachusetts. .The' same rule was appled -in Kennedy vs. Whitwell, 4 Pick. 466, which was in trover, and after the defendant
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sold the goods for a greater price; but it was held that the value
at the time of the conversion was the measure of damages, and so
in Sergeant et al. vs. Franklin Insurance Company, 8 Pick. 90, it
was held that the value of the stock at the time it should have
been transferred was the rule, and the court adopt the doctrine
of Gray vs. Portland Bank, and Kennedy vs. Whitwell, and-consider this case as standing on the same ground as the conversion
of goods; and so is Henry vs. Manufacturers' and Mechanics'
Bank, 10 Pick. 415, where certificates of stock were withheld.
In replevin, the value of the property when it ought to have been
restored, is the true measure of damages: -Swift vs. Barns, 16
Pick. 194-6; in ,S'mith vs. Dunlop, 12 Ill. 184, which was much
considered, and the English and New York cases examined, the
rule in Massachusetts is sustained. In Hopkins vs. Lee, 6 Wheat.
106, held that the value of the land when it ought to have beei
conveyed, which was when it was paid for, was the measure of
damages. So in Cox vs; Henry, 32 Penn. St. Rep. 18, which
was a contract to convey real estate ; the price having been paid
in advance, it was held that the value at the time it should have
been conveyed is the measure of damages. 'In Mitchell vs. -ill,
12 N. H. 390, it was said that the value at the time of the breach
is the measure of damages. But this is laid down as a general
proposition, and the distinction arising from previous payment
is not adverted to, nor do we find such a distinction recognised
in any New Hampshire case. See also Stephens vs. Lyford, 7V .
H. 360.
There being, then, much conflict in the authorities, the question
is to be settled upon principle; and it may he -assumed that the
plaintiff is entitled to such damages as will be a full indemnity for
withholding the stock.
The general rule is, undoubtedly, that he shall have the value
of the property at the time of the breach, and this is a plain and
just rule and easy of application, and we are unable to yield to
the teasons assigned for the exception which has been sanctioned
in New Yort and elsewhere. It is true that in some cases the
plaintiff may have been- injured to the extent of the value of the
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property, at the highest market price, between the breach and
the time of trial.
But it is equally true, that in a large number of cases, and perhaps generally, it would not be so. In that large class of cases,
where the articles to be delivered entered into the common cbnsumption of the country in the shape of provisions, perishable or
otherwise; horses, cattle, raw material, such as wool, cotton, hides,
leather, dye stuffs, &c. ; to hold that the plaintiff might elect as
the rule of damages in gll' cases, the-highest market price between
the time fixed -for the deflivery and the day of trial, which is often
niany years after the breach, would, in many cases, be grossly
unjust, and givb td the plaintiff an amount of damages wholly dis.
proportioned to the injury. For, in most of the cases, had the
articles been delivered according, to the contract, they would have
been sold or consumed within the year, and no' probability of
f'eaping any benefit from the future increase of prices. So there
ziffy be repeated trials of the same cause by review, new trial, or
btherwise; siall there be a different measure of value at each
trial?
In the' case of sfocks, in. regard to which the rule in England
originated, there are, doubtless, cases, and a great many, where
they are purchased as a permanent investment, and to be held
without regard to ffuctuations, and to hold tht: the damages
should be the highest price betiveen the breach and the trial;
where there is no reason to suppose that-a sale would have been
made at that precise time, would also be unjust.
But it may be fairly assumed that a very large proportion of the
stocks purchased are purchased to be sold soon; and to give the purchaser, in case of a failure to deliver such stock, the right to electtheir value at any time before trial, which might often be several
years, would be giving him not indemnitymerely, but a power in
many instances of unjust extortion, which no'court could contemplate
without pain. In view of such results the courts in England and
New York have been inclined to shrink from the application of that
rule in many cases, and it has been. held that-it would not be
applied where the action was not brought in-a reasonable time;
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and this undoubtedly because of the injustice of allowing the plaintiff to take advantage of the fluctuations of many years. But,
even if brought in a reasonable time, and what is a reasonable
time is not easy to say, there might be often a lapse of many
years before a final trial.
In actions of trover, trespass, and replevin, there would be
stronger reasons for the appliQation of such distinction than in
cases of contract; inasmuch as the plaintiff is not only deprived
of the use of his property, and the means to replace it, from the
avails, but is so deprived by the tort of the defendant.
If then the rule is just, it should be applied in these actions; the
f6rm of the action not being material in this respect-and in jurisdictions where this doctrine is recognised, it has been so applied,
as in Wilson vs. Mathews, 24 Barb. 295; and Greening vs. Wilkinson, 1 0. & P. 625, which was trover for East India warrants
for cotton. In Wilson vs. Htathews, the highest market price
between the breach and the day of trial was held to be the rule.
In this State no such rule has been 'adopted, and it requires no
citation of authorities to show that as applied to actions of trespass, trover or replevin, it would find no countenance here.
The same reasons which oppose the right of electing the value
at any intermediate day, as the rule of damages apply also to an
election between the time of the breach and the time of the trial,
and we are disposed to hold the value at the time of the breach,
or when the articles ought to have been delivered, as the just and
convenient rule.
In accordance with our views is the case of Wyman vs. American Powder Works, 8 Cush. 168. In that case the corporation
refused to give the plaintiff a certificate of shares to which he was
entitled, or to recognise him as owner, but old them to another.
And it was decided that the defendant was liable to the value of
the shares at the time of the demand, and interest from that time,
and with this decision we are satisfied.
Therefore, after reducing the amount to accord with these views,
there should be judgment on the verdict.
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The learned judge has discussed the
cases so much at length in the foregoing
opinion, that little more remains to be
said upon the questions involved.
I. The question in regard to what
constitutes a delivery of shares in a
joint-stock company is liable to arise in
so many different forms, that it is difficult to lay down any universal rule upon
the subject.
1. The contract, as between the immediate parties, is sufficiently executed,
and the title completely passed, as a
general thing, by the mere assignment
and delivery of the certificate of the
shares. Parker, Ch. J., in Howe vs.
Starkweather, 17 Mass. R. 244; Sargent vs. Franklin Ins. Co., 8 Pick. R. 98 ;
Wilson vs. Little. 2 Comst. R. 443. And
this may be effected generally by a blank
indorsement upon the certificate of
shares, which the holder may fill up at
his convenience. Kortright vs. Buffalo
Com. Bank, 20 Wendell, 91; Angell &
Ames on Corp. 564.
But where the charter of the company,
or the general laws of the State, contain
any specific restriction or requirement in
regakd to such transfer, it must be complied with, or the title does not pass.
Fisher vs. The Essex Bank, 6 Gray, 373;
Sabin vs. Bank of Woodstock, 21 Vt. R.
862; Pittsburgh and Connellsville Railway vs. Clarke, 29 Penn. St. R. 146.
2. But, in most of the'States, this
mere delivery and transfer of the certificate of shares will not be regarded as
sufficient notice of the transfer, as to
creditors and subsequent purchasers,
who have bona fide acquired title in ignorance of the former transfer. For
that purpose some notice given at the
place where inquiries in regard to the
title of the shares would most likely be
made, seems to be required. This is the
more common mode of effecting the delivery of choses in action.

Thus, notice to the trustees of equitable property, by the rules of equity jurisprudence, as administered in the English courts, gives a priority over an
earlier assignment without such notice:
1 Story Eq. Ju., 421 b; Foster vs. Blackstone, 1 My. & Keen, 297; Timson vs.
Ramsbottom, 2 Keen R. 85. In Dearle
vs. Hall, 3 Russ. R. 1, Lord Lyndhurst.
said: "In cases like the present, the act
of giving the trustee notice is, in a certain degree, taking possession of the
fund; it is going as far towards equitable possession as it is possible to go; for,
after notice given, the trustee of a fund
becomes a trustee for the assignee who
has given him notice." A different rule
prevails in the State-of New York; but
it is not regarded -as resting upon any
satisfactory foundation : 1 Story Eq. Ju.
421 c, and cases cited.
8. -It is upon this ground mainly, we
-apprehend, that notice is required to be
given of the transfer of shares in jointstock companies at the office where the
principal records of title in the capital
stock is kept; since the company itself
being a mere trustee of the capital stock
for the shareholders, notice to them will
perfect the delivery of the equithble title
to 'the shares ; -and being a trust, which
is always a mere equity, it is not susceptible of any other than an equitable
delivery. Sturges vs. Knapp, 81 Vt. R.
1, 53. All corporate action, as well that
of the directors and agents as of the
corporation itself, is but a succession of
trusts, in xegard to which the creditors
of the corporation, in the order of their
priority, are the primary, and the shareholders the ultimate cestuis que trust. lb.
4. If, then, notice is to be given the
trustee, in order to perfect the transfer
as against creditors and subsequent purchasers, it must be done at the place
where such notice is usually received
and registered; and it should be in a
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form to gain credit, and to enable the
company to preserve it in their usual
mode of preserving such facts, and that
is by entry upon their books of transfer,
which would bring us to the same result
arrived at in the principal case: 1 Story
Eq. Jur., 1 400 b, and cases cited. This
subject of the requisite notice of the
transfer of equitable rights and of choses
in action, as well as of the delivery of
chattels in the keeping of third parties,
is considered in the late case of Rice vs.
Courtis, 32 Vt. R. 460. The rule in Vermont requires more to be done in the
case of personal chattels in the possession of third parties, in order to effect a
delivery, than in most other States. It
requires that the keeper should consent
to become the bailee of the purchaser;
while, in other States, the notice makes
him such bailee, and if, after that, he
treat the former owner as still entitled
to control the property, he will make
himself responsible to the purchaser.
Chitty on Cont. 406, et seq. Cases
cited above.
II. In regard to the rule of damages
adopted by the Court in this case, there
can be no question as applicable to the
ordinary case of the refusal to aeliver
articles readily obtainable in the market.
The English courts have attempted to
make the case of shares in joint stock
companies, and some others, exceptions,
and to give such damages as will more
completely indemnify the owner for the
loss of the article.
1. Equity will decree specific performance of a contract to deliver shares in a
joint stock company, since they may not
always be attainable in the market.
Duncuft vs. Abrecht, 12 Simons R. 189;
Shaw vs. Fisher, 5 De G. M. & G. 596;
Story Eq. Jur.,
724, 724 a; Taylor vs.
Great Indian Peninsular Railway, 4 De
Gex & Jones, 559; S. C. 5 Jur. N. S.
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1087. But will not grant such decree
for the specific performance of contracts
for the delivery of public stock in the
national funds, which may always be
obtained for the market price. Redfield
on Railw., 38, pL 2, and cases cited in
notes.
2. The more usual remedyagainst the
corporation for refusing to allow the
transfer of their shares into the name of
one who turns out upon the trial to have
been the real owner, and entitled to have
the shares stand ii his name, is by bill
in equity. In Davis vs. The Bank of
England, 2 Bing. R. 393, where the
owner of shares in the defendant's company brought an action to recover the
value of them and of the dividends declared upon them, on the ground that
the bank had refused to recognise him
as the owner, and had suffered them to
be transferred into the names of third
parties, by virtue of forged powers of
attorney, the court said, "We cannot
do justice to this plaintiff unless we hold
that the stocks are still his," and therefore denied the action for the value of
the stocks, but allowed the party to recover the dividends which had been declared and not paid. See also Taylor vs.
Great Indian Peninsular Railway, supra.
3. But if the recovery of damages is
to be made the equivalent of such stock,
as in many cases it is obvious it must be,
there seems no other rule so satisfactory as the one here adopted. The idea
of giving one the advantage of the rise
of the market as long as the action remains undetermined, is certainly a most
fanciful conceit, and could only have
arisen froit regarding the defendant as
wholly in the wrong, and thus entitled to
demand no favor at the hands of the
Court. This may do well enough in
cases where the party has acted wantonly or in bad faith ; but, in the ma-
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jority of cases, the defendant may well by his default. The same view of the
be presumed to have acted in the same general rule of damages is taken in the
good faith as the plaintiff; and if so, late case of Hill vs. Smith et al., 32 Vt.
there is no reason why he should be R. 433, and there can be no question i;
mulct in an amount of damages alto- is destined to prevail in all the courts
gether beyond what it is made reason- of this country.
ably certain the other party has suffered

I.F. R.

In the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District
of rennsylvania.
CONSTANT vs. THE ALLEGHENY INSURANCE COIPANY.'
1. Though by the Charter of an Insurance Company it is provided that "every
contract, bargain, and other agreement," in execution of the powers of the company, "shall be in writing or print, under the corporate seal, and signed by the
President, or, in his absence or inability to serve, by the Vice-President or other
officer, &c., and duly attested by the Secretary or other officer, &a.," a parol
agreement as to the terms on which a policy shall be issued, made by the President, Secretary, or other general agent of the company, may, nevertheless, be
enforced specifically in a court of equity, which, in case of a previous loss, will
be by a decree for the amount which would be due upon a policy duly executed;
GRxa,

J.

2. But a mere collateral agreement, which does not involve the execution of a policy
of insurance, is not within the scope of the general authority of an officer or
agent of such a corporation, and cannot be enforced.
3. The plaintiff, through a broker, applied to the defendants for an insurance on a
boat for a definite amount, and was informed that "it would be taken." The
defendants subsequently sent to the broker their own policy for a part, and the
policies of three other companies for the residue, executed by an agent for the
latter companies. The broker, on receiving the policies, wrote, in the absence
" of his principals, to the defendants, to say that he doubted whether the agency
policies would be accepted, alleging, as a reason, that the particular agent had
not a good reputation for "settling losses," and added, "Idon't know whether it is
your custom to guarantee the offices you insure in, or not; if you do, I may prevail
on" the plaintiff "to hold the policies." The Secretary of the defendants in
reply, wrote: "In handing the policies" to the plaintiff, ",you can say that if
the boat is not insured in offices satisfactorg to him, we will have them cancelled;
but, though they are not re-insurance, yet in case of loss we will feel ourselves
bound for a satisfactory adjustment. We deem the companies good, and if any
partiescan settle with them, we can." On the faith of this letter the plaintiff closed
I From the MSS. of 3 Wallace, Jr.
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the transaction. One of the substituted companies afterwards became insolvent,
and, a loss having occurred, a special action on the case was brought against the
defendant: Hdd, (1.) That the Secretary of the defendants had no general
authority to bind them by a guaranty of the solvency of the substituted companies ; and, (2.) If he had, his letter did not amount to this, but only to an
undertaking for a satisfactory determination of the amount of the loss, and its
apportionment between the insurers.

Constant and others, including the captain of it, Bowman, were
owners of a steamboat, upon which they were about to make an
insurance. One Springer was a correspondent of the Allegheny
Insurance Company of Pittsburg, the defendant in the case, and in
the habit of getting customers for it, which he had authority to do,
but he had no authority to make contracts for the Company. Captain Bowman, for himself and in behalf of the other owners, applied to Springer, as agent of the Allegheny Company, to get an
insurance of $20,000 on the boat. Springer communicated with
the Company by telegraph, to know if they would take the risk,
and received for answer "that it would be taken ;" and Springer
so informed Bowman, who requested Springer to write to defendants to take the risk. Springer did so, informing them of the
names of the owners, and their respective interests. The defendants
agreed to take the risk, and sent to Springer five policies of insurance, covering the risk of $20,000; two of them of $2500 each, in
favor of Captain Bowman, executed by themselves; one for $5000,
in favor of Bowman, executed by the "Pennsylvania Insurance
Company;" one for $5000, in favor of plaintiff, executed by the
" Quaker City Insurance Company;" and the other for $5000,
executed by the " Commonwealth Insurance Company," in favor
of the remaining owner, one McGhee.
When these five policies were received the owners and the boat
were absent on their voyage, and Springer wrote to the Secretary
of the Allegheny Insurance Company as follows:
"Your favor, together with the policies on the steamer, came to
hand. I was very much disappointed in receiving the three policies from agencies. Altogether I am very much afraid, when the
boat comes back, that the owners will not have them. They expected them to be taken in Pittsburg offices, and they were issued
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by Mr. Carrier, whose reputation for settling losses is not very good
in this city. As far as my own knowledge goes, he never settles
without a law-suit. I don't know whether it is your custom to
guarantee the offices you insure in, or not; if you do, I may prevail on them to hold the policies. I will keep the policies until
they return, and do the best I can to get them to keep them; but
I know the owners are very much prejudiced against the ' Commonwealth' and 'Quaker City' (they have agencies here), and if
they -will not keep them, I can only return them. I can say no
more until the boat returns."
To this letter the Secretary of the Company defendant replied,
as follows:
"In handing the policies to the owners of the boat, you can
say, that if she is not insured in offices satisfactory to them, we
will have them cancelled; but though they are not reinsurances,
yet in case of loss we will feel ourselves bound for a satisfactory
adjustment. We deem the companies good, and if any parties can
settle with them, we can."
When Springer presented the policy of insurance executed by
the Quaker City Insurance Company to the plaintiff, he objected
to it. Springer then informed him of the contents of the letter
aforesaid, upon which the plaintiff "gave his premium note for
$750, and the matter was closed."
It may be pertinent to observe, that by legislative enactment
insurance companies in Pennsylvania, except in cases of special
charters, are "empowered to make, execute and perfect such contracts, bargains, agreements, policies, and other instruments as
shall or may be necessary, and as the nature of the case may
require, and every such contract, bargain, policy, and other agreement shall be in writing or print, under the corporate seal, and
signed by the President, or in his inability by the Vice-President,"
&c., and that subject to this act the Allegheny Insurance Company, the present defendant, held its charter.'
Soon after the insurance effected by the correspondence and acts
1 Act of 2d April, 1856,

10, and Act of 29th January, 1859, P. L., p. 10.
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already mentioned, the steamboat was lost; and the Quaker City
Company having become wholly insolvent, this suit, a special
action on the case, was instituted at law, to recover the amount
from the defendant, the Allegheny Company.
The facts as above stated, were found on a special verdict; judgment being to be entered for $5265.83, if the Court thought that
they made out a case for the plaintiff, otherwise for the defendant.
The opinion of the Court was delivered by
GRIER, J.-To entitle the plaintiff to judgment on this verdict,
he must show,
1st. That on the facts as found the Sec'etary of the Insurance
Company could legally bind the Company to guarantee an insurance made by another Insurance Company.
2d. That such a promise or agreement was made, in such form
as to support an action at law against the corporation.
By its act of incorporation this Company could make insurance
which would be legally valid only by a policy attested by the President, Secretary, and the seal of the corporation. Yet, before
such instruments are attested in due form, the President or Secretary, or whoever else may act as a general agent of the Company,
may make agreements, and even parol promises, as to the terms
on which a policy shall be issued, so that a Court of Equity will
compel the Company to execute the contract specifically ;' and
where the loss has happened, to avoid circuity of action the Chancellor will enter a decree directly for the amount of the insurance
for which the Company ought to have delivered their policy, properly attested.
The Secretary of the Company, in this case, replied by telegram
to one sent by Springer, who acted as a broker or niutual agent of
the parties, not that the defendants would themselves take the
whole risk of $20,000, but "that it should be taken." The Company showed their construction of their undertaking by transmitting policies to the amount requested, equally divided among four
insurance companies, as negotiated by defendants, and divided
I See Corn. Ins. Co. vs. Union Mutual, 19th Howard, U S. Reports, 318.
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among the three several owners of the boat, according to. their
respective interests. The objection made by the insured was not
to the manner in which the risk was divided, but that the agent
of one of the companies (the Quaker City) had the character of
being a very troublesome person to deal with in case of a loss
which would require adjustment.
Assuming the representation of the Secretary, that in case of
loss" we will feel ourselves bound for a satisfactory adjustment,"
is an agreement to guarantee the solvency of the Quaker City Insurance Company, had the Secretary authority to make a simple or parol contract to bind his principal to guarantee the
solvency of another company? We think he had not. Every
promise to make a policy of insurance under the seal of the Company, and the terms on which it will be done, falls necessarily
within the scope of the authority confided to such agent; but any
other merely collateral promise or representation, which does not
involve the execution of a policy of insurance, is not within the
scope of his authority, as agent, because it is not strictly within
the scope of the powers granted to the corporation.
Whether the officers of the corporation could, by covenant, duly
executed, but not in the form of a policy of insurance, bind the
Company to perform such a contract, we need not inquire. This
is a suit at law, and the plaintiff must show a legal obligation,
executed according to the forms required by the law, which confers
the corporate powers on the defendant. And if it were a bill in
equity, the Chancellor would decree only a specific execution, to
wit, the delivery of an instrument of writing, executed and attested
according to law, and such as was within the powers of the corporation as provided by their charter.
But assuming that this parol promise, as stated in the Secretary's letter, would support a suit at law against the Company, is
there a promise to guarantee the solvency of the Quaker City, or
any of the three other companies who joined in taking this risk of
$20,000? The parties did not complain that the defendants would
not take the whole risk on themselves, but had it negotiated and
divided among other companies. The objection was not made to the
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solvency of any of the companies, but on the anticipated difficulties
of adjustment in case of a loss occurring. The undertaking of
the Secretary is not that the defendant shall pay the amount of
the loss, but to take the trouble of adjusting the loss with this
captain's agent. This might be an easy matter for the defendants'
officers to perform, as the very same adjustment would have to be
made with and for themselves, and other companies who were not
infested by such an agent.
The adjustment of a loss is defined to be the "settling and
ascertaining of the indemnity which the assured, after all allowances and deductions made, is entitled to receive under the policy,
and fixing the portion which each underwriter isliable to pay."
Now, the direction of the Secretary to Springer is to tender the
policies, and if they are not satisfactory to the owners, to cancel
them; stating that they are not re-insurances, and that "we feel
ourselves bound not to pay the losses if the other insurers should
be insolvent," but "for a satisfactory adjustment," and adding,
"we deem the companies good, and if any parties can settle with
them, we can." Here is no guarantee. The whole length and
breadth of this undertaking is a satisfactory adjustment of the
loss, and no more.
The facts as found by the jury, do not, therefore, support the
claim alleged in the declaration. The defendants are consequently
entitled to judgment on the special verdict.
Judgment for the defendant.
The preliminary question presented in it is certain that for a considerable pethe foregoing case, as to the effect of a riod neither express regulation nor usage
parol insurance, is of considerable inte- made any particular form essential to
rest and importance, and though it may its validity, and that the contract was
be considered as to a great degree set- often left in parol: the assured, says t
tled in this country by the authorities Cleirac, trusting to the good faith and
which will be presently cited, a few ob- honesty of the other party. "But,"
servations on the grounds on which the he adds, "the abuses and disputes which
principal decisions have been rested, resulted from this mode of dealing,
caused its abolition- and it has even
may not be altogether superfluous.
While it is difficult to say at what pre- been subsequently provided that the concise time the practice of insurance was tract shall be made either in the preintroduced or became general in Europe, sence of a notary, or by the intervention
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of a register of policies of insurance."
Valin, Comm. sur l'Ord. de la Mar., liv.
iii., tit. vi. 2 ; 3 Boulay Paty, 244. The
change, which required the contract to
be in writing, is said to have been first
effected by an ordinance of the Magistrates of Barcelona, in the year 1484,
and has since been followed by all the
principal commercial codes of the continent. Whether such provisions concern
the substance, or merely the evidence of
the contract, has been a matter of considerable discussion. Under those contained in the former Ordonnaneede la Ma7ine, and in the present Codede Commerce,
art. 332, which direct simply that the
contract "shall be drawn up in writing,"
it has been considered that this does not
make a verbal contract void in itself,
but simply precludes its proof by oral
testimony, leaving it still possible to
establish it by the written admissions of
the parties, or by reference to the serment
decisoire, that is, the examination of the
defendant under oath; Pothier, No. 99 ;
Valin, ,ut supr. ; 3 Boulay. Paty, 247
(tit. x. sect. 1;) 3 Pardessus Cours de
Droit Com. 972; though, see Emerigon
of Insurance (by Meredith) p. 25. Indeed, by the very terms of the Code, the
contract may be by any private writing
under the hand of the party, containing
all its essential terms.
These citations are made because it
seems to have been sometimes supposed
that by the general commercial law of
the continent, a contract of insurance
must necessarily be contained in some
such formal written document as that
which we now designate as a "policy,"
whereas it is a mere matter of municipal
regulation, varying in different countries. There can be no.doubt that at
common law a verbal contract of this
character was valid; and it is so now in
England, except so far as it is affected
by the Statute of Frauds, or the Stamp

Act. In this country, particularly in the
large commercial towns, a great deal of
the business of insurance is done upon
parol agreements, and even the subsequent issue of a policy is often dispensed
with. The sudden exigencies of commerce, and the use of local agencies,
make this sometimes a matter of necessity. Therefore, though the question as
to the validity of such agreements has
been raised at times with apparent earnestness, they have been generally sustained by the courts. The proper course
is to proceed in equity for a specific performance of the agreement by the issue
of a policy in due form, and where a loss
has actually occurred, a decree may be
entered at once for the amount: McCullough vs. Eagle Ins. Co., 1 Pick. 280;
Hamilton vs. Lycoming Ins. Co., 5 Barr,
342; Delaware Ins. Co. vs. Hogan, 2
Wash. C. C. 4; Perkins vs. Washington
Ins. Co., 4 Cow. 645; Tayloe vs. Merchants' Fire Ins. Co., 9 How. 465 ; Commercial Mut. M[arine Ins. Co. vs. Union
Mut. Ins. Co., 19 How. 318 ; 2 Curtis,
524; Trustees of First Bapt. Church vs.
Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 19 N. Y. 305; 18
Barb. 69; Palm vs. Medina Fire Ins. Co.,
20 Ohio, 529; Mobile Dock, &c., Co. vs.
McMillan, 31 Alab. 711. And in some
cases it has been held that an action at
law would lie: McCullough vs. Eagle Ins.
Co., Hamilton vs. Lycoming Insurance
Co., Mobile Marine Dock, &c., Co. vs.
MeMillan, ut supra. After a loss, the
damages in such an action would probably be the same as if a policy had in fact
issued; but, in general, the remedy in
equity is the most efficient. So where,
after an agreement, a policy has been
executed, but is withheld from the insured, trover will lie: Kohne vs. Ins. Co.
of North America, 2 Wash. C. C. 93; see
Watson vs. McLean, Ellis, B1. and ElI. 73,
and note.
But this is not all; it has further been
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held, as in the foregoing case, not to be
material that, by the charter of the Insurance Company, or by a general law,
policies and other contracts of insurance
are to be under seal, signed and countersigned by particular officers. Comm.
Mutual Marine Insurance Co. vs. Union
Mutual Insurance Co., ut supr. ; McCullough vs. Eagle Insurance Co., ut supr. ;
New York Insurance Co. vs. De Wolf,
8 Pick. 63; Trustees, &c. vs. Brooklyn
Fire Insurance Co., ut supr. ; see Myers
vs. Keystone Insurance Co., 27 Penn. St.
270; but see Cockerill vs. Cincinnati
Mutual Insurance Co., 16 Ohio, 148,
which, however, seems overruled by
Palm vs. Medina Insurance Co., 20 Ohio,
529, so far, at least, as the remedy in
equity is concerned. The reasons usually
assigned are, that the particular modes
of contracting pointed out in the statute
do not necessarily exclude others, and
thAt the agreement in such case amounts
not to an insurance itself, but to a
contract to execute a policy in the required form. Still it must be confessed
that the distinction, however ingenious,
is not altogether satisfactory. The Legislature could hardly have meant to insist on certain formalities in the execution of a policy, and yet to permit so
simple a mode of evasion, as the substitution of an informal but binding agreement in place of the regular contract.
Perhaps the difficulty may be somewhat
removed by considering the payment of
the premium, and the delivery of the
usual receipt or memorandum, as analogous to part performance under the Statute of Frauds. The relief being on
this hypothesis exclusively in equity, and
therefore subject to the discretion of the
Court under the whole circumstances of
the case, many of the dangers which the
Legislature may be supposed to have in-

tended to guard against will be precluded. A further advantage which this
view presents is, that the insurance is
thereby made to relate to the time when
the agreement was actually concluded,whereas, if the latter is to be considered
merely as a contractfor the execution of a
policy, it raises several difficult questiois as to whether a reasonable time is
to be allowed for the execution, whether a demand must be made by the insured, or whether a non-compliance by
him, with some colliteral or unimportant
regulation, would justify a refusal or delay to execute, al4 of which might affect
or postpone the time of the actual commencement of the risk.
Be this as it may, there are obvious
reasons why the doctrine of these lastmentioned decisions should not be extended too far. Experience has shown
that the most fertile sources of litigation
in insurance cases are, first, disputes as
to the declarations and representations
of the parties, and, second, disputes as
to the authority of agents or officers of
insurance companies. It is wise legislation which seeks to mitigate these evils
by requiring as far as possible, consistently with the exigencies of business of
which we have spoken, that the terms of
the contract shall be put in writing, and
evidenced, on the part of the corporation, by the signatures of officers as to
whose powers there can be no question.
Perhaps we may be justified, by these
considerations, in confining the class
of cases to which -we refer, to those
which are strictly within the scope of
the ordinary business of the Company,
and where also, from the necessity of the
case, the preliminaries of the contract
must be settled in an informal manner.
H. W.

